Mouna Apperson dated Natasha Kaminsky from 2012 to 2013 and with Adrianne Norman from 2016 to 2017. After the relationships broke up, Norman told several people Apperson raped and abused her, and Kaminsky told others (in person and through an extensive social media campaign intended to reach those with whom Apperson dealt personally and professionally) that Apperson stalked and raped her, was a serial rapist and serial abuser, was restrained from coming within 500 feet of her, and threatened to kill both her and Norman.
Apperson sued both women for defamation. At the close of Apperson's case, the trial court sustained Kaminsky's and Norman's separate motions for directed verdict claiming Apperson failed to present independent evidence of actual damage to his reputation. Both motions asserted: "Plaintiff must introduce evidence, beyond his own statements, that their reputation has been harmed and that it was harmed by the statements attributed to the defendant." (Emphasis added). Norman and Kaminsky contended all of Apperson's evidence of reputational damage came from his own testimony and, therefore, was insufficient. The trial court sustained both motions and entered judgment for the defendants.
The reason this is even an issue is a quirk in Missouri law. Most jurisdictions recognize something called "defamation per se." Per se defamation refers to statements that are so defamatory on their face that the plaintiff doesn't have to prove they harmed his reputation. A jury may presume the damage. But, perhaps because it's the "show me"state, Missouri doesn't recognize the concept of per se defamation. A plaintiff must prove reputational harm; a jury can't presume damage. That begs the question, what kind of evidence suffices?
Relying on some Missouri precedent, the trial court concluded that plaintiffs can't rely solely on their own testimony. But the trial court should have given those cases a more careful read. In the leading case, the court had held: "[plaintiff] made only a conclusory statement that her reputation was injured and that she felt embarrassed, shocked, mad because of the poster.... [She] did not name a single person who held her in lower regard after seeing the poster." The trial court relied on this quote to support its holding that defamation plaintiffs may never rely solely on their own testimony. But the trial court read too much into the precedent, and ignored the key word – "conclusory."
While Apperson relied solely on his own testimony, it was not "conclusory." Apperson testified that following Norman and Kaminsky's statements, a group of people (several of them armed) supporting Kaminsky and Norman confronted Apperson in his home. Because of this confrontation, Apperson was forced out of his home for seven months. Kaminsky's statements also resulted in Apperson being asked not to patronize a local coffee shop, being made to disassociate himself from two organizations he founded, and losing a speaking engagement. Finally, Apperson testified that he was involuntarily removed from shared office space after Kaminsky told the management Apperson raped her and insisted management take action against him.
The Supreme Court ruled that all this detail regarding actual damage was not "conclusory." It reversed the orders granting directive verdicts and remanded the case for a new trial. That doesn't mean Apperson will win, but it at least gives him a fighting chance.